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    • However Aggarwal states that developing countries are not

    2018-11-13

    However, Aggarwal (2004) states that developing countries are not yet entirely familiarized with the use of AD. He argues that these countries are using it as a way of retaliate the traditional users due to their excessive number of AD cases opened against developing countries. He suggests that an overall nk1 receptor in the use of AD could be possible if traditional users could reduce the use against developing countries. To Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2008) the widespread use of AD among developing countries has helped to boost the overall use of this mechanism by itself. According to them, there would be a “contagion effect” associated to AD (i.e.: some countries could start to use AD just by seeing other nearby countries using it). The retaliation and the contagion effect could help to explain the proliferation this tool after the Uruguay round. Regarding to Uruguay round, Prusa (1999) reveal that the antidumping issue was one of the main topics of this round of negotiations (which was marked by the opposite position between traditional and non-traditional countries about the AD use). “Broadly stated, the debate pitted the traditional users of antidumping, essentially industrialized countries such as the US and EC, against traditional non-users, primarily developing countries” (Prusa, 1999, p. 1). The author reveals that, due to the efforts of The USA and The European Community, it was not possible to restrict the use of the AD. Consequently, the Uruguay Round was not only incapable of reducing the AD use among the traditional users, but ended up encouraging the less traditional countries in its use. According to Zanardi (2004), this meeting ended up boosting an expansion of the AD use among traditional users (such as The United States, Canada, The European Community, Australia and New Zealand) as well as in countries without tradition in the use of antidumping measures (such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa, among others). The Graph 1 shows that the number of AD cases initiated by the WTO\'s countries actually rose at the end of the Uruguay Round (in 1994). The rise is noteworthy until 2001. From 2002 on, there seems to be a general decrease in the use of such measures. Literature still does not completely grasp the facts that cause oscillations in the number of AD cases. Nonetheless, Ahn and Shin (2011), when analyzing the number of cases that were initiated between 1995 and 2009, argue that “the overall trend of AD investigations clearly shows the counter-cyclical movement that the increases of AD investigations during the early and the late 2000s have coincided with global economic recession.” This hypothesis is also defended by Bown (2011). According to him, the use of the major measures of trade protection (which include the antidumping) frequently rise when there is an economic crisis. He observed this phenomenon into the following crises: 1990–1991, 1997–1998 and 2001–2002. After 2001–2002 recession, the number of AD started to decline and became more stable. This reduction in the use of AD could be explained by the end of 2001–2002 recession and due to the further liberalization negotiations, carried out by WTO members in 2001, under the ideas of Doha Round (Bown, 2011). For Feinberg (2010), the role of developing countries, regarding the use of AD, increased after Uruguay Round. Consequently, the AD cases started to depend, more and more, of these countries. In 2003, maybe due to the excess of cases initiated in the last period, the relation between the quantity of open cases and the quantity of AD measures applied, reached its peak: a percentage of 95.6%. This result may be explained by the accumulation of judged measures in 2003. However, on the other hand, it could also indicate certain benevolence of the regulative authorities toward the petitioners firms. Anyhow, this relationship has stabilized in the following years. In 2008, 2009 and 2012 the number of opened cases grew again. This new rise could be related to the American real-estate sector crisis, which spread throughout the world generating negative reflexes in the economic activities of diverse countries.